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1. Introduction 
Genetically engineered or modified viruses (GMVs) are being increasingly used as live 
vaccine vectors and their applications may have environmental implications that must be 
taken into account in risk assessment and management processes. In most legislative 
frameworks GMVs are treated as GMOs (genetically modified organisms), which require 
ERA (environmental risk assessment) in addition to the evaluation of the quality, safety and 
efficacy of the product before marketing authorization or clinical trial applications are 
submitted. The ERA is performed in order to identify the potential risks for public health 
and the environment that may arise due to the use and release of GMVs. If risks are 
identified and considered as not acceptable, the ERA process should go on to propose 
appropriate risk management strategies capable to reduce these risks (Anliker et al., 2010; 
Kühler et al, 2009).  
To obtain marketing authorization within the EU, a GMV has to meet the criteria and 
requirements of the EU pharmaceutical legislation for both medical and veterinary 
applications, as well as the EU environmental legislation on the deliberate release of GMOs. 
Hence, although viruses are not organisms, it will be necessary to perform an ERA similar to 
the procedure under Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release of GMOs into the 
environment. For the purpose of an ERA, an organism is defined as a biological entity 
capable of replication or of transferring genetic material, and this definition will then 
include viruses and also replication-incompetent viral vectors. A MAA (marketing 
authorization application) for a GMV submitted to the European Medicines Agency (EMEA) 
has to include an ERA in accordance with the principles set out in Annex II Directive 
2001/18/EC and its supplementing Commission Decision 2002/623/EC. The further 
process is well described in recent reviews, e.g. by Anliker et al. (2010) and Kühler et al 
(2009). Briefly, the ERA should be based on the technical and scientific information about 
the GMV as required in the Directive Annexes III and IV. The continued procedure is 
somewhat different from the deliberate GMO release process of the Directive. But even so, 
difficulties in preparing ERAs for GMVs may arise from the fact that Directive 2001/18/EC 
has a nearly exclusive focus on GM plants and agricultural products. Therefore, the EMEA 
has developed two specific guidelines for the preparation of ERAs to facilitate adaptation of 
www.intechopen.com
 
Genetic Engineering – Basics, New Applications and Responsibilities 200 
the requirements and the methodology of the Directive to GMO-containing medicinal 
products. In addition, the GMV ERA needs to be performed according to the national 
Member State requirements to obtain authorization of GMV clinical and of field trials. The 
individual Member State may have different requirements, e.g. dependent on whether the 
trial is considered “contained use” according to Directive 98/81/EC or a “deliberate release” 
according to Directive 2001/18/EC. The former is focusing on containment measures, i.e. 
implementation of physical, chemical and biological barriers to preclude the GMV-
environment interactions. In contrast, the deliberate release Directive is based on a thorough 
case-by-case assessment of the potential environmental risks arising from GMV release or 
escape, and the biosafety measures to be utilized in order to eliminate or minimize these risks. 
The objective of an ERA in accordance with Directive 2001/18/EC is to identify and assess 
on a case-by-case basis the potential harmful effects of a GMO for humans, animals 
(domestic and wildlife), plants, microorganisms and the environment at large (Anliker et al., 
2010). Potential adverse effects should be acknowledged and considered irrespective of 
whether they are direct or indirect and whether the emerging effects appear immediately or 
delayed. When such effects have been identified, appropriate measures for their reduction 
or elimination need to be defined. Such measures have to be based on the realization that 
transmission of GMVs to non-target individuals, species or the environment at large may 
allow the GMV to spread further. In its turn this may induce genetic or phenotypic changes, 
competition with existing species or horizontal gene transfer of hereditary materials 
between species. To fully conceive and evaluate the environmental risks associated with 
such, and other, potential scenarios, detailed case-by-case knowledge of all possible adverse 
effects of a given GMV is crucial, because the quality and relevance of the ERA, and the 
possibilities for efficient risk management, are totally dependent on the ability to anticipate, 
predict and reveal potential adverse effects. This again is dependent on the society’s 
willingness to invest in “what-if?”-based and precautionary science and in acknowledging 
and weighing the values that are knowingly or unknowingly influencing the decision 
making process following a MAA for a GMV application.   
The main focus of risk-related research has previously been on the functionality and the 
intended immunological mechanisms of GMVs, while work on safety aspects, particularly 
in relation to ecosystem effects, often have been put off until later in vaccine development. 
By then, making fundamental changes to the vaccine in order to improve its safety can be 
extremely costly and time-consuming. In some cases hazards and irreversible harms may 
have been initiated already. Hence, we will argue that risk assessment and management 
should not be considered as two separate processes.  
Traditionally, risk assessment has been considered as a ”scientific” process, while risk 
management and communication has included value judgments with regard to acceptability, 
the trade-off criteria and the adaptation of strategies for coping with uncertainty. However, 
risk assessments are influenced by scientific, ethical, economic, social and political 
information. For instance, risk assessments include value judgments both with regard to 
consequences that should be avoided and the process of risk characterization. Consequently, 
risk assessment and management strategies need to be connected from the very start of a 
vaccine development project in order to unveil the full spectrum of environmental impacts.  
In this article we describe GMV applications and the environmental impact questions and 
challenges that are connected to them. We then proceed to discuss the relevance and 
shortcomings of the present risk assessment framework and how this framework needs to  
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be better connected to risk management strategies. Such management strategies are 
developed within particular frameworks that need to include awareness to normative 
standards and preferences regarding human relation to the natural environment. Moreover, 
we will elaborate on how precautionary motivated research involves the need to advance 
hypotheses about GMV specific harm and hazard endpoints and that such endpoints are 
dependent on both the objectives of ERA and of the management strategies. 
2. Creation and applications of GMVs 
Genetically engineered or modified viruses (GMVs), from a number of taxons, are being 
increasingly used as live vaccine vectors. The so far approved veterinary vaccines have most 
commonly been based on replication-competent canarypoxvirus or herpesviruses, and 
EMEA has published a guideline for Live Recombinant Vector Vaccines for Veterinary Use. 
There are 4 broad GMV application areas that may have environmental implications:  
i. Immunization against infectious diseases in livestock species;  
ii. Immunization of wild life species which are reservoirs of infectious agents causing 
disease in humans and livestock species;  
iii. Control of pest animal population densities by either direct lethal control operations or 
immuno-contraception; and  
iv. Human vaccination programs against infections diseases or cancers.  
In all cases there may be circumstances that enable GMVs to jump species barriers directly, 
or following recombination with naturally occurring viruses. All the different applications 
may, to varying extents, represent release or unintended escape of GMVs into the highly 
varying ecosystems.  
The different application areas call for different considerations and options with regard to 
choice of virus vectors and genetically engineering (GE) strategies. Generally spoken, there 
are two strategies: The first is represented by gene-deleted viruses to be used for homologous 
vaccination, i.e. to achieve protective immunity against the GMV itself. The engineered 
deletions most commonly target genes that are necessary for the virus to carry out a full 
multiplication cycle, or are implied in viral virulence. Furthermore, “non-essential” genes 
may be deleted in order to obtain markers for monitoring unintended vaccine virus spread. 
Lack of the deleted marker gene will indicate that a field virus isolate originate from a GMV. 
A number of gene-deletion GMVs for vaccination against human and livestock diseases 
have been marketed, or are in the final stages of clinical trials. Most of them belong to the 
herpesvirus or adenovirus families.   
Recombinant virus vectors obtained by transgenesis represent the second strategy. Such 
viruses are created in cell cultures by simultaneous transfection with a plasmid carrying a 
gene from the virus/microbe that is to be immunologically targeted, and infection with the 
virus vector of choice. The plasmid construct is such that the transgene contains DNA 
sequences homologous to a viral gene in each end. Hence the transgene is transferred and 
integrated to a predetermined site in the virus vector genome by homologous 
recombination. The most commonly used vector viruses are members of the DNA virus 
families Poxviridae and Adenoviridae. In many cases the vectors have been engineered by 
both endogenous gene deletions and transgene insertions. 
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At present there are considerable research efforts going into designing replication-incompetent 
versions of the most attractive vector viruses. This is possible under the qualification that the 
non-replicating vector is able to express the vaccine transgene and raise protective 
immunological responses at the same levels as the parental replication-competent virus 
strain. The main purposes are to minimize the risk-prone possibilities of productive infections 
with shedding of virus in the excreta of GMV-exposed individuals, and reversal of attenuated 
or modified viruses to full virulence through reversion of attenuating mutations.  
Diseases for which GMV-vectored vaccines have been developed or are in the process of 
being developed, include AIDS, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Epstein-Barr 
virus, cytomegalovirus, West Nile virus, tuberculosis, malaria, influenza (human and 
equine), Rinderpest, Rift Valley fever, borreliosis, trypanosomiasis, leishmaniasis, cervical 
cancer, breast cancer, colorectal cancer, mesothelioma and melanoma. Most of the GMV 
vectors employed are assumed replication-incompetent, and are derived from members of 
the poxvirus and adenovirus families. 
3. Vaccines and vaccination (modified from Traavik, 1999) 
All vaccines have in common the intention to prevent disease or limit the effects of disease. 
Both humoral (antibody-mediated) and cellular arms of the immune system can contribute 
to a pathogen-specific acquired response that distinguishes specific immune protection from 
the innate and more general protection mediated by phagocytes (i.e. macrophages 
neutrophils and dendritic cells), cytokines and physical barriers. Because vaccination against 
a threatening disease may take place many years before exposure to the pathogen, 
immunological memory is a critical element. A long-lived immune response, which may be 
mobilized and augmented rapidly when called for, is essential. 
Vaccination may have different purposes and fields of application. The most important are: 
• Protection against and treatment of infectious diseases 
• Protection against and treatment of cancer 
• Induced infertility in domestic animals and wildlife 
An ideal vaccine provides an optimal mobilization of the adaptive immune system with no 
unwanted side effects, and with long-lasting immunological memory. The most universal 
purpose is to prevent disease in individuals and prohibit transmission of disease agents 
between individuals. Generally, vaccination must be carried out before the individual 
becomes infected, but for some diseases, e.g. rabies, disease may be prevented even if 
vaccination takes place after infection. 
Some important human and domestic animal pathogens, e.g. rabies virus, hantaviruses and 
a number of arboviruses, have reservoirs in free-ranging wildlife animals. Human and 
animal disease may then be prevented by vaccination of reservoir animals. Likewise, some 
free-ranging mammalian species are considered «pests» in the context of human food, 
animal fodder or other kinds of production. Enforced infertility following vaccination is 
now becoming an alternative to culling (“stamping out”) for control and reduction of such 
pest animal populations. 
Cancer cells often express surface antigens not present on their normal counterparts. Such 
unique antigens may provide targets for vaccines that may induce immune reactions to 
prevent and combat cancer cells. 
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Depending on the species, target-organs, epidemiological considerations etc., the vaccine 
delivery method and route may differ. In practical terms, the vaccine may be delivered by: 
• Injection, most commonly intramuscularly or subcutaneously. The recent development 
of injection, so-called “gene guns” are used to propel small gold particles covered with 
antigen through the skin. Such procedures are often referred to as “biolistics”. 
• Inhalation of vaccine-containing aerosols. 
• Ingestion of vaccine-containing vehicles, i.e. capsules. 
• For fish: Bathing in or spraying with vaccine containing solutions 
• For free-ranging animals: Baits containing vaccines that are spread out over the selected 
target area from airplanes or helicopters.  
To a varying extent, all vaccine delivery strategies imply that vaccine-containing materials 
may end up in unintended locations, and hence release or escape of biologically active 
macromolecules (i.e. DNA or RNA), viruses or microorganisms into the environment may 
take place. 
4. Viruses that are used as GMVs 
Generally spoken, the families most widely employed as GM vaccine vectors have been 
members of the Poxviridae, Adenoviridae and Herpesviridae families. The frontrunners have 
been GM versions of the poxvirus genera Orthopoxvirus and Avipoxvirus. Our own 
experimental and sustainability oriented research have focused on these genera, and we will 
in section 5, 6 and 7 proceed by using such GM vectors as examples of ERA and risk 
management challenges.  
There is now a tendency that GM viral vaccines are based on vectors that are replication-
incompetent in the target species of choice. Such vectors may be selected on the basis of 
natural host species barriers, e.g. avipoxviruses with birds as natural hosts, and assumed 
replication-deficient in mammalian species. Other commonly used vectors have been made 
replication-incompetent by cell cultivation procedures (e.g. MVA, see below) or targeted 
genetic engineering, e.g. adenovirus vectors. 
Veterinary vaccines against infectious diseases containing replication-competent GMVs 
have been on the market in the EU since the beginning of year 2000 (Kühler et al., 2009). 
Several vaccines for human use are currently in various stages of clinical trials, and a few of 
them, mostly based on adenovirus or poxvirus vectors, have already been approved for 
marketing. 
4.1 Poxviruses as GM vaccine vectors 
Our account will henceforth be directly relevant for poxvirus vectors, but at least in a 
general sense it will also be relevant for GMV vectors developed from other virus families.  
Poxviruses are selected as potential vectors for several reasons (Liu, 2010): the extensive use 
of the smallpox vaccine (and the related modified vaccinia ankara), which provided 
knowledge of the human safety parameters; the large gene capacity for the insertion of a 
heterologous gene encoding the antigen of interest; the broad tropism of the virus for 
mammalian cells that could then result in a number of cells expressing the vaccine protein 
(heterologous antigen); the production of vaccine protein for a relatively short period of 
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time (making the kinetics of the production of the heterologous protein more akin to antigen 
production from an acutely infecting pathogen, but less useful for gene therapy 
applications); and the location of the virus in the cytoplasm, thus avoiding integration risks 
that might occur with other alternatives, as a retroviral vector for example (Mastrangelo et 
al., 2000). The earliest vector for delivery of a heterologous antigen is a licensed veterinary 
vaccine employing a MVA (Modified Vaccinia Ankara) vector to deliver a rabies antigen 
(Mackowiak et al., 1999). The vaccine was developed for delivery as bait for wild animals. 
The success of using a vector to deliver an antigen that generated immunity sufficient to 
protect animals and curtail outbreaks in the wild, via oral delivery of bait (hence with 
imprecise dosing), in a variety of animal species, demonstrates many of the advantages of an 
ideal vector, in this case efficacy, safety, and even ease of distribution (oral delivery), which 
would not have been as facile with a non-vectored vaccine. Oral delivery may mobilize 
protective local immune responses on mucous membranes, a great asset for human, 
domestic animal and wildlife vaccines.  
Various poxvirus vectors have undergone human clinical testing as HIV vaccines. In the 
largest clinical trial, a canarypox vector coding for HIV antigens was utilized as the first 
component of a prime-boost regimen in a clinical trial of an HIV vaccine involving 16,000 
individuals (Rerks-Ngarm et al., 2009). In another prime-boost vaccination protocol for 
prophylaxis of HIV, the priming is being done with a DNA plasmid, followed by an MVA 
vector boost 
(http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT00820846?term=DNA+%2B+MVA+for+HIV&rank=5). 
4.2 Vaccine history, general characteristics and taxonomy of the family Poxviridae 
The bicentennial celebration of the first vaccination took place 15 years ago. In 1796 Edward 
Jenner injected cowpox virus into the boy James Phipps, and later on challenged him with 
fully virulent human smallpox (variola) virus. The boy survived, and Jenner had hence 
protected him against one of the most dreaded human diseases of all times. The smallpox 
vaccination story ended in a triumphant eradication, in 1979, of variola virus and smallpox 
disease, due to a world-wide vaccination campaign. (Fenner et al., 1988). In recognition of 
Edward Jenner´s contribution, procedures that aim at protection against disease by pre-
mobilization of the immune system were termed “Vaccination”, derived from the Latin 
word vacca, hence honoring the cowpoxvirus. In that context it is well worth for present day 
scientists to reflect on the fact that the contemporaries of Jenner rejected his findings.  
The family Poxviridae contains a vast number of complex DNA viruses that replicate in the 
cytoplasm of vertebrate and invertebrate hosts. The member viruses have been sorted into 
two subfamilies based on their host preferences, namely, the Chordopoxvirinae (infecting 
vertebrates) and Entomopoxvirinae (infecting invertebrates, more specifically arthropods). 
The Chordopoxvirinae consists of eight genera with different host ranges, namely, 
Orthopoxvirus, Parapoxvirus, Avipoxvirus, Capripoxvirus, Leporipoxvirus, Suipoxvirus, 
Molluscipoxvirus and Yatapoxvirus. The Entomopoxvirinae is divided into three genera 
based on the insect host of isolation. These are designated A, B, and C entomopoxviruses, 
respectively. Genetic information on the entomopoxviruses is very scanty.   
The distinctive characteristics of members of the family Poxviridae include: 
• A large and complex virion (larger than any other animal virus particles) with virion-
associated transcriptase used for virus-specific mRNA synthesis. The virions are very 
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resistant to environmental degradation. This is an advantage for the shelf life of 
vaccines, particularly in areas with unsatisfactory cooling conditions. But persistence in 
the environment may also enhance the chances of transboundary movements and non-
target infections. 
• A large genome composed of a single linear double-stranded DNA molecule, 130-300 
kbp, with a hairpin loop at each end. The genome facilitates insertion of one or more 
transgenes with a collective size of up to 20-30 kbp. Vaccine vectors carrying a number 
of vaccine transgenes may hence be constructed. Theoretically, a single vaccine may 
protect about a number of diseases that are prevalent in specific geographical areas or 
defined age groups.  
• The complete viral multiplication cycle takes place in the cytoplasm of the host cell, 
without presence in the latter’s nucleus. This is of course a major biosafety asset of 
poxviruses, since it precludes the insertion of viral DNA into the host genome, and the 
putative adverse effects that may arise by such events. 
The poxviruses are diverse in their structure, host range and host specificities. Members of 
each of the 8 genera of the subfamily Chordopoxvirinae are genetically and antigenically 
related and share similarities in morphology and host range within the genus. For example, 
similarities in the restriction endonuclease maps of several Orthopoxvirus genomes, such as 
the 90% sequence identity of the genes of Vaccinia and Variola viruses reflect genetic 
relatedness of members of each genus. It is, therefore, not surprising that intra-genus cross-
hybridization has been reported among these viruses.  
Genetic divergence exists between members of each genus, particularly when such members 
come from geographically separated econiches. Indeed, Weli et al. (2004) even observed 
genetic heterogeneity among avipoxviruses isolated from different parts of Norway.   
Sequence similarities of genomic repeats in various strains of each virus species suggests 
that these repeats evolved from unequal crossover events. Thus, genetic material of each 
virus bears a pointer to genetic recombination in its history. Further examination of the 
Orthopoxviruses shows evidence of genetic transpositions and deletions in the terminal 
hypervariable regions of the genome. The significance of these genetic interactions or 
phenomena in the ecology of poxviruses is at present a matter of conjecture but they makes 
risk assessment in the use and release of poxvirus-based GMVs absolutely necessary. 
4.3 Ecological distribution of Poxviridae 
The family Poxviridae contains a vast number of divergent viruses with equally divergent 
host specificities and host ranges. It seems justified to state that poxviruses will be found in 
any vertebrate species and geographical area where they are systematically looked for. 
However, very little is known about the characteristics and geographical distribution of 
most poxviruses occurring naturally in the field. This knowledge would be necessary if a 
meaningful risk assessment of poxvirus-based GM vaccines use or release in any target area 
should be undertaken. Without such knowledge there is no possibility of making 
meaningful ERA inclusions of adverse effects due to recombination events between GM 
poxvirus vaccines and naturally occurring poxviruses circulating within the actual area for 
application. 
Many poxviruses are capable of zoonotically infecting man. It is likely that variola virus is 
derived from an ancient zoonotic virus that originated from a now extinct animal host  
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species. In general, poxviruses show species specificities that range from narrow to broad, 
but we still know little about the fundamental mechanisms that mediate the host tropism of 
individual poxviruses (McFadden, 2005). The unpredictability in a real world situation is 
illustrated by a macaque outbreak caused by a European orthopoxvirus strain carried by 
Rattus norvegicus in the Netherlands (Martina et al., 2006).  
Variola virus (smallpox disease) has killed more members of the human population over the 
span of recorded history than all other infectious diseases combined. Variola virus may 
never again infect humans, but there are other poxviruses that can cause serious human 
disease. In 2003, an outbreak of human monkeypox occurred in the mid-western United 
States due to the inadvertent importation of monkeypox virus in a shipment of rodents from 
West Africa (Reed et al., 2004). Fortunately, the strain that caused this outbreak was more 
benign in humans than the more pathogenic variant that is found in central Africa, which 
results in mortality rates of 10–15%. 
Variola virus, prior to its eradication, spread all over the world. Similar worldwide 
distribution seems to be true of VACV and Molluscum contagiosum virus. Man was the only 
known host and reservoir of Variola and Molluscum contagiosum viruses. Although the 
reservoir host of VACV is unknown, it has been shown, under natural conditions, to exhibit 
a wide host range among humans, rabbits, cows and buffaloes. Other poxviruses with 
worldwide distribution include numerous species of Avipoxvirus. Even with the relatively 
limited studies so far done, certain orthopoxviruses (parapoxviruses, capripoxviruses and 
yatapoxviruses) are notably associated with African domestic animals and wildlife, including 
rodents, squirrels and monkeys, which may serve as reservoirs of infection. Knowledge of 
the distribution of poxviruses that infect man and with host range which includes wildlife 
such as rodents, squirrels and monkeys, would be important in risk assessment of poxvirus-
based GE vaccines and other poxvirus-based recombinant constructs prepared for use or 
release in ecosystems to which these hosts belong. Similarly, it is important to document the 
poxviruses carried by ectoparasites of animals in the target localities. 
4.4 Poxvirus vaccine vectors 
Poxviruses are being increasingly used as recombinant vectors for vaccination against 
numerous infectious diseases in humans, domestic animals, and wildlife (Pastoret & 
Vanderplasschen, 2003). For risk assessments and surveillance, information about the 
occurrence, distribution and ecology of poxviruses are hence important.  
Poxviruses have several advantages for use as expression or vaccine vectors, including their 
large insertion capacity, their cytoplasmatic site of replication, their heat stability, the relatively 
high expression levels and proper post-translational modifications of foreign proteins as 
well as the ability to raise protective immune reactions locally on mucous membranes. 
Vaccinia virus (VACV) strains are robust eukaryotic expression vectors that have been used 
for a number of different studies in biochemistry, cell biology, and immunology. Most 
vaccinia virus strains, such as the ones used in the smallpox eradication campaign, readily 
replicate in human cells and have been associated with a range of clinical complications in 
vaccinees. This fact is presently considered a major problem for the use of these strains as 
recombinant vaccines for mass vaccination. For laboratory use, in addition to mandatory 
biosafety level 2 procedures, proper precautions must be taken to prevent accidental 
exposure when managing replication-competent vaccinia strains. 
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4.4.1 Non-replicating poxvirus vectors 
To circumvent the problems associated with “classical” vaccinia virus strains, several 
laboratories have been increasingly involved in efforts to develop more attenuated, host-
restricted virus strains (for brief review, see McFadden, 2005). Generally, these efforts 
involve two related strategies: i). The isolation of chicken cell-culture adapted vaccinia virus 
variants that are replication-deficient in mammalian cells, for example MVA, or ii). The 
development of avipoxvirus platforms, such as canarypox (ALVAC) and fowlpox (TROVAC), 
supposed to be naturally non-permissive for mammalian cells. There is increasing evidence 
that such non-replicating vaccines are safer than the original vaccinia strains and are still 
comparably immunogenic. 
4.4.1.1 MVA (Modified vaccinia virus Ankara) 
Among the so-called “non-replicating poxvirus vectors”, modified vaccinia Ankara (MVA) 
has elicited considerable interest because of its excellent safety record in humans, its ability 
to mobilize different protective arms of the immune system, and the possibility to raise local 
mucosal membrane immunity after oral delivery. In addition to being a promising vector for 
the construction of poxvirus-based recombinant vaccines, one appealing feature of MVA as 
an expression vector is that it can be used under biosafety level 1 laboratory conditions. 
MVA has in common with NYVAC and other adapted VACV strains that they are 
supposedly not carrying out fully productive infections in “relevant” mammalian cell types. Such 
VACV strains do, however, secure efficient expression and presentation to the immune 
system of protein products from transgenes inserted into different locations in the viral 
DNA genome. 
MVA was derived from a Turkish smallpox vaccine strain (Ankara) (reviewed by Drexler et 
al., 2004). After more than 500 passages in chicken cells, it tested defective for replication in 
human cells and avirulent in lab animals. From 1968–1980, MVA was inoculated into more 
than 100,000 individuals in Germany with no reported secondary complications and it is 
now considered to be a suitable platform for the next generation of safer smallpox vaccines 
and recombinant poxvirus vectors. Genomic mapping and sequencing studies have revealed 
that MVA lost nearly 30 kb of genomic information during its extended passage in chicken 
cells. Furthermore, it has multiple deletions and mutations compared with the parental 
strain. Many of these genetic alterations were in host-response genes. It is assumed that 
these deletions render MVA unable to carry out productive infections in human cells. 
MVA has been proven very efficient in induction of mucosal immunity. This is of course 
utterly important since a number of human and animal disease agents use mucosal surfaces 
as their portal of entrance to the organism. 
4.4.1.2 Avipoxvirus vectors 
Like MVA, canarypox virus (ALVAC) and fowlpox (TROVAC) vaccine vectors induce 
antibody and cytotoxic T-cell responses, critical in the immune defense against viruses, to 
vectored viral antigens in a range of mammalian species (Hel et al., 2002; Srinivasan et al., 
2006). Replication of avipox virus vectors is regarded abortive in mammalian cells, 
eliminating the safety concerns that exist for replication competent vaccinia virus vectors. 
The avipox viruses infect mammalian cells and produce viral proteins, with the replication 
block occurring at the time of viral DNA synthesis. It should, however, be noted that the 
experimental data backing claims for total lack of avipoxvirus replication in mammalian  
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cells are based on studies embracing very few viral species or strains, and also very few, and 
mostly virus-ecologically irrelevant, mammalian cell cultures. For some 
avipoxvirus/mammalian cell combinations fully productive infections have been 
demonstrated (Weli et al., 2004).  
Licensed ALVAC-vectored vaccines for dogs, cats, horses, chicken and ferrets are 
commercially available, and an ALVAC-vectored HIV-1 vaccine has entered phase III 
clinical trials. Some additional ALVAC-vectored HIV-1 and some human cancer and malaria 
vaccines are in clinical phase I or II trials (Weli & Tryland, 2011). 
4.5 Current research on risk assessment of GMVs 
There is little peer-reviewed information available that relates to ERA of GMV releases. To 
our knowledge research related to environmental effects is only being performed for 
alphaherpesviruses (Thiry et al., 2006) and poxviruses (orthopox and avipoxviruses). Such 
environmental biosafety-related research has been performed for a number of years in 
Norway, but we have no present knowledge of other research groups with a similar focus. 
We have concentrated on biosafety issues of the orthopoxvirus strain MVA (Modified 
Vaccinia Ankara), considered to be a very safe vaccine vector because of high gene 
expression capacity and lack of viral replication in mammalian cells (Drexler et al., 2004). 
The most relevant conclusions from our studies may be summed up as follows: 
• Orthopoxviruses, and hence potential recombination partners for orthopoxvirus 
vectored vaccines, are common in different small rodent species populations all over 
the country, and small rodent predator species are infected by and have antibodies to 
such viruses (Sandvik et al., 1998, Tryland et al., 1998). 
• Recombination between an influenza-transgenic MVA and a naturally occurring 
orthopoxvirus is readily demonstrated in cell cultures. The recombinants may have 
phenotypic characteristics, some of which may point towards adverse effects, different 
from the parental viruses. Recombinants may be genetically unstable and “throw out” 
the influenza transgene. This will eliminate the most logical tag for vaccine monitoring, 
and will also diminish the ability of the vector to mobilize protective immune responses 
(Hansen et al., 2004). 
• The absolute and relative permissivities for MVA multiplication and viral shedding 
have not been thoroughly studied. GM and unmodified MVA may, contrary to the 
general dogma, perform fully productive infections in highly relevant mammalian cell 
types, and other mammalian cell cultures that are semi-permissive to infection (Okeke 
et al., 2006). 
• DNA sequencing revealed that orthopoxviruses can be clearly separated into 
geographically distinct strains, and it was inferred that these strains have distinct 
evolutionary histories in different rodent lineages (Hansen et al., 2009). It is an open 
question whether these different virus strains have aberrant abilities to engage in 
recombination events with GM vaccine vectors.  
• Upon sequencing of an orthopoxvirus isolated from a human clinical case, it was 
established that this strain was a naturally occurring hybrid between two distinct 
orthopoxvirus species. This is the first proof of concept for orthopoxvirus recombinations 
taking place under authentic ecological circumstances (Hansen et al., 2011).  
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• Homologous recombination between orthopoxvirus-vectored vaccine and naturally 
circulating orthopoxviruses, genetic instability of the transgene, accumulation of non-
transgene expressing vectors or hybrid virus progenies, as well as cell line/type specific 
selection against the transgene are potential complications that may result if poxvirus 
vectored vaccines are extensively used in animals and man (Okeke et al., 2009a). 
• Phenotypic characteristics of recombinants between GM and naturally occurring 
orthopoxviruses may be unpredictably different from any of the parental viruses 
(Okeke et al., 2009b). 
• Contrary to common assumptions, some avipoxviruses may carry out productive 
infections in mammalian cells, and avipoxviruses within a restricted geographical area 
may be more genetically diverse than realized so far (Weli et al., 2004 and 2005).  
5. Features by GMVs that are relevant for risk assessment and management 
frameworks  
Directive 2001/18 with annexes, the EMEA guidelines and CPB with annexes give a number 
of leads towards GMO characteristics that may indicate hazards or adverse effects. 
Characteristics that must be taken into consideration (Anliker et al., 2010) include the 
pathogenicity, virulence, infectivity, host range, tissue tropism, replication strategy, 
latency/reactivation, survival and stability of the GMO. Here we will point to two 
important features by risk assessment and management frameworks that may cause 
difficulties when preparing ERA and risk management strategies for GMVs. 
5.1 The distinction between chemicals and organisms 
Risk perspectives used on chemical pollutions have been influential when shaping risk 
concepts in biosafety related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and hence also 
GMVs. We will argue that, and discuss why, this starting point is of very doubtful relevance 
to self-replicating organisms and molecules. 
When the first genetically modified plants were approved and released the adequacy of the 
present framework for assessment of chemical substances i.e. ecotoxicological assessment, 
for GMOs was contested (Meyer, 2011). Chemicals have a release-dependent concentration 
decline with a given breakdown time in the environment, while GMOs follow a different 
environmental routes and degradation pathways than chemical pollutants. (Trans)Genes 
follow the path of the host genome, possibly eventually also the path of sexually compatible 
and some incompatible species (through vertical and horizontal gene transfer). Thus for 
GMOs exposure do not necessarily predict response, and accordingly risk models (based on 
the premise that exposure dose predicts response) have no or little utility in predicting the 
environmental behaviour of released transgenes. This was illustrated for example when 
Hilbeck et al. and Losey et al. reported adverse effects of Bt toxins and Bt maize pollen on 
non-target organisms in laboratory experiments (Hilbeck et al., 1998, Losey et al., 1999). To 
improve ecotoxicological testing, Andow and Hilbeck (2004) have suggested that 
investigation of non-target effects of GMOs may be done more efficiently by employment of 
a combination of two models; Ecotocixology testing of chemicals and risk assessment of 
non-indigenous species. However, the ecotoxicological approach still remains the 
recommended one in risk assessment procedures of GMOs although the new EU biosafety 
Directive 2001/18/EC partly supports the ecological approach since it prescribes a more 
detailed ERA.  
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5.2 The distinction between viruses and organisms (modified from Traavik, 1999) 
It is important to keep up the distinction between viruses and organisms. Viruses are not 
organisms. Furthermore, the differences in genome strategies and life cycles between virus 
families are often more fundamental than between different mammalian or plant families. 
Viruses multiply intracellularly in permissive host cells. One single virus particle (virion) 
infecting a permissive cell may give rise to billions of new particles during a short time 
(hours to days). The submicroscopic size of virions and the ability to spread over vast, even 
global, distances during short timespans are important, basic conceptions for ERA and risk 
management of any GMV. This is important in order to ask the relevant harm and hazard 
related questions, and hence to realize and conceive the risks connected with a given GM 
vaccine virus in a specific ecosystem and society context. 
In addition to such fully productive infections, some virus/host cell combinations may 
result in persistent infections with virus shedding in the excreta for extended periods, while 
others lead to latent infection with viral DNA in a host chromosome-integrated or episomal 
state. Latent infections may be intermittently reactivated and accompanied by virus 
shedding. Integration of viral DNA into the host cell genome may by itself have harmful 
consequences, irrespective of viral gene expression or replication. The same virus strain 
may, under differently modulating conditions, display all these life cycle forms. 
The host tropism, at the species-, organ- or cell type-level, is quite narrow for some viruses, 
while others have a much wider host-spectrum. For most viruses the molecular, genetic and 
epigenetic pathways determining host-cell specificity are not known in detail. Restrictions 
may be present at various steps during a virus multiplication cycle, from the lack of cell 
membrane receptors to subtle incompatibilities with host cell enzymes necessary for viral 
nucleic acid transcription and replication. Hence, minor genetic changes taking place during 
or after engineering of GM viruses may have profound effects on the host tropism and 
ability to spread to non-target host species. 
For many virus/host cell combinations permissivity is a relative term, since it may be 
influenced to a considerable extent by the menu of genes expressed by the cell, and by the 
exact levels of gene expression. In culture, the permissivity of a given host cell may be 
manipulated experimentally by activation of intracellular signal transmission pathways, i.e. 
by hormones, growth factors, cytokines etc. Such procedures may also enhance persistent or 
reactivate latent infections. At the intra- as well as at the inter-species level of host animals 
this is illustrated by a vast variation in susceptibility for a given virus strain. Such variation 
may be related to sex, age, mating season, pregnancy, genetic differences, infection with 
other viruses or microorganisms, and environmental factors promoted by season, climatic 
changes or by pollution, e.g. EDCs (endocrine disrupting chemicals).  
It is important to be aware of the distinction between viral infection and viral disease. An 
infected individual may shed virus and represent a transmission reservoir without showing 
clinical symptoms. Yet, other individuals within the same or other species may become 
clinically ill, or the viral infection may result in abortions, stillbirths, teratogenic or 
oncogenic effects. For persistent/latent infections, clinical symptoms may be present 
intermittently, only under special circumstances, or appear a long time after infection. 
Different strains of the same viral species may have different virulence or pathogenicity, as 
well as host-cell or -species tropism. Even genetic differences at the single point mutation 
level may result in virus strains with aberrant phenotypic characteristics. 
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For GMVs it is hence conceivable that unintended phenotypic characteristics with unwanted 
ecological consequences may be established in addition to the intended modification(s). This 
may not become evident unless very comprehensive and carefully planned experiments and 
ecosystem surveillance/sampling programs are carried out. In many instances fully 
adequate studies are totally precluded by the complexity and the regular or occasional 
variations of the recipient ecosystem. Hence scientific uncertainty or ignorance is a state that 
must be accepted.  
6. The connection between risk assessment and risk management 
According to Anliker et al. (2010), an ERA based on Directive 2001/18/EC should follow 
four general principles:  
“First, the GMO should be compared to the non-modified organism from which it is derived. 
Second, the ERA should be carried out on a scientifically sound premise and rely on known 
facts supported by data derived from specific testing of the GMO-containing medicinal 
product including its use in previous clinical trials. If necessary, this data can be substantiated 
by theoretical assumptions. Third, it is necessary to perform the ERA on a case-by-case 
basis, since the heterogeneity of the GMO-containing medicinal products and the differences 
in their clinical use make it difficult to apply standardised requirements or evaluations as 
part of the assessment. Finally, the ERA needs to be re-evaluated if new information on the 
GMO or its effects on human health or the environment becomes available.” 
We find it an interesting and elucidating statement that “data can be substantiated by 
theoretical assumptions”. This opens the ERA gate for creation and inclusion, as well as 
theoretical, mathematic and experimental modeling, of hypotheses build on “Worst case 
scenarios”, as pointed out by Kühler et al. (2009), and also for the use of stringent 
Precautionary principle versions in situations and processes dominated by scientific 
uncertainty and ignorance (see section 9). 
The case-by-case and step-by-step approaches to GMV ERAs seem to be instituted in all 
relevant national and international legislations, including EU Directive 2001/18/EC and the 
Cartagena protocol on biosafety (CPB). Any ERA should include comparative data about 
characteristics of the GMV and its unmodified parental virus strain. Details about the 
genetic modification/engineering process, including data about effects, genomic location 
and DNA sequence of the transgenic (vaccine gene) insert must be present. Descriptions of 
the vaccination regime and release/possibilities for escape of the GMV must be considered. 
The receiving environment/ecosystem, including possible interactions between the GMV 
and the environment, have to be described. Plans for monitoring, control, waste treatment 
and emergency response plans have to be prepared and presented, and this is, of course, 
tasks that overlap with risk management activities.  
Anliker et al. (2010) state: “Experience gained from the release of comparable GMOs into a 
similar environment can be used to support the ERA”. In our view this is to some extent an 
unwanted premise for trustworthy ERAs since it opens up for subjective interpretations of 
“comparable GMOs” and “similar environment”. Theoretical considerations and practical 
experience indicate that such parameters rarely exist for engineered organisms, and are even 
more rare for viruses. This should become evident while reading and reflecting on the 
scientific ignorance, uncertainty and lack of knowledge related to the nature, characteristics 
and ecology of GMVs.  
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The ERA procedure may be scientifically and operationally divided into five steps, whereby 
the ERA and risk management is integrated and coordinated (described in an excellent 
review by Anliker et al., 2010):  
1. Identification of potential adverse effects;  
2. Evaluation of the potential consequences of each adverse effect, if it occurs;  
3. Evaluation of the probability (likelihood) that each identified potential adverse effect 
should occur;  
4. Estimation of the risk posed by each identified characteristic of the GMO;  
5. Application of risk management strategies related to marketing or deliberate release of 
the GMO;  
6. Evaluation of the overall risks of the GMO, based on the conclusions from the previous 
steps, taking into account the risk management strategies proposed in step 5, which 
were created to reduce or eliminate the risks identified in step 4.  
Through the outlined procedure each potentially harmful characteristic of a GMO should be 
turned into risks. The total process should form a basis for consideration of the overall risk 
to the ecosystem, animal and human health by deliberate release or marketing of a given 
GMO. The ERA should conclude on whether there is a need for a risk management plan. If 
necessary and possible the ERA should devise appropriate risk mitigation methods. And of 
primary importance: The ERA should reach a conclusion as to whether the overall 
environmental impact is at all acceptable or not (Kühler et al., 2009).    
Step 1 of the ERA procedure is focusing on the identification of GMO characteristics that 
may result in adverse effects. This is the decisive step for whether, and to which extent, the 
ERA and the risk management plans will provide biosafety and make contributions to 
sustainable development as well as to good health of ecosystems, animals and humans.  
In our opinion the creative conception and design of “What-if?”- and Worst-case-scenario-
inspired ideas, questions and working hypotheses, must be encouraged and stimulated in 
order to enhance the chances of high precaution levels in ERA and risk management 
processes. Furthermore, we will argue that these goals will only be met if independent 
scientists and institutions carry out the relevant intellectual processes and research projects. 
Finally, although national legislations, and also the Cartagena protocol, require documented 
scientific evidence as a basis for ERAs and risk management plans, implementation of the 
Precautionary principle is always expressively required (Kûhler et al., 2009). The different 
versions, interpretations and possibilities for implementation of the precautionary principle 
are further discussed in section 9. 
6.1 Relevant risk assessment and management questions for GMVs 
The different virus families have their specific life cycles and host-preferences. Hence it is 
impossible to make risk assessment schemes that are valid for all potential virus vectors. 
Risk assessment must be performed on a case-by-case, step-by-step basis, taking into 
account the characteristics of the ecosystem into which the virus will be released, and the 
ability of the virus to engage in transboundary movements (Traavik, 1999; McFadden, 2005).  
The most evident risk issues related to release of GMVs or unmodified viruses are the 
known and unknown unknowns related to (i) whether active multiplication with virus 
shedding in excreta takes place in target individuals, (ii) infection of non-target species, (iii) 
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recombinations with naturally occurring virus relatives and (iii) integration of GMV DNA 
into host cell chromosomes.  
Ideally, before running the risk that any GMV becomes implanted into a 
species/population/new location/ecosystem a number of crucial questions should be 
answered (modified from Traavik, 1999), e.g.: 
• Can the released virus engage in genetic recombination, or by other means acquire new 
genetic material? If so, will the hybrid offspring have changed their host preferences 
and virulence characteristics? 
• Can the released virus or any hybrid or mutated offspring be shed in the excreta of 
intentionally or unintentionally infected individuals?  
• Can the released virus or any hybrid or mutated offspring infect unintended (non-
target) species? 
• Can the released virus or any hybrid or mutated offspring integrate into the genomes of 
host cells?  
• Can other viruses that are present within the ecosystem influence the infection with the 
released virus or its offspring?  
• Can insects or migrating birds or animals function as vectors for the released virus or its 
offspring, to disseminate viruses out of their intended release areas? 
• May climatic changes and/or xenobiotic pollutants, e.g. EDCs (endocrine disrupting 
chemicals), influence the virus/host animal/ecosystem interactions? 
• For how long can the virus and its offspring survive outside host organisms under 
realistic environmental and climatic conditions? 
• Are the virus and its offspring genetically stable over time? 
• Can the virus or its hybrid or mutated offspring establish long-lasting, clinically mute, 
persistent or latent infections in naturally accessible host organisms? 
• Can the virus or its offspring activate or aggravate other naturally occurring latent or 
persistent virus infections? 
Some of these questions deal with the genetic and phenotypic characteristics of a 
supposedly genetically stable GMV. But the situation becomes even more complex and 
unpredictable if the GMV parental strain under certain conditions or circumstances is 
genetically unstable, giving rise to viral strains with altered characteristics (Traavik, 1999). 
At the present time it is strongly needed that questions and hypotheses related to the 
influence of climatic changes and xenobiotics, e.g. endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs) 
are included in ERAs and risk management plans. 
Demanding ERA and risk management challenges connected to all the questions raised in 
this section are related to whether methods allowing detection of the phenomena listed, and 
still unlisted, have been developed, and whether the surveillance and monitoring programs 
that make their employment possible have been funded and operationalized.  
7. Biosafety Implications for environmental risk assessment and 
management frameworks 
We will argue that in order to harvest the potential benefits of any GMV, the approaches 
used in the Norwegian orthopoxvirus studies should be part of the regulatory risk 
governance frameworks all over the world (see section 4.5 as well as 6.1). In relation to ERA 
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and risk management needs, some of the most urgent issues for targeted research will be 
treated in the following.  
7.1 Naturally occurring relatives 
With GMV use and release, it will be crucial to determine the occurrence, distribution and 
ecology of poxvirus relatives. In Norway rodents and other small mammals are considered 
to be natural reservoirs for different orthopoxviruses, and cowpoxvirus-like strains in 
particular (Sandvik et al., 1998). Approximately 20% of shrews and small rodents belonging 
to eight species carry orthopoxvirus DNA sequences in their organs, and 20% of such 
animals have specific serum antibodies as a sign of previous infections.  
7.2 Potential recombination events and their consequences 
If a GM orthopoxvirus infects an individual, animal or human, that already carries another 
orthopoxvirus, a recombination event, homologous or illegitimate, may follow. Foreign 
genes may hence be transferred from the GM donor virus to other GM poxvirus vaccines or 
to wild type orthopoxvirus recipient strains (Sandvik et al., 1998). The outcome may be hybrid 
viral progenies with unpredictable pathogenicity and altered host range. The probability 
and possible outcome of recombination is dependent on the characteristics of the viral 
vector used, and the occurrence of naturally occurring or genetically modified relatives.  
In cell culture co-infection experiments with a MVA-based human influenza vaccine and a 
newly isolated Norwegian cowpox virus-like strain, a number of recombinant progeny virus 
strains were obtained (Hansen et al., 2004). One of the progeny strains displayed phenotypic 
characteristics different from both parents, and was genetically unstable upon cell culture 
passage, i.e. the influenza transgene was deleted at a high frequency. This is of paramount 
monitoring significance, since the inserted gene will always be the marker of choice for 
tracing and detection of vaccine-related effects.  
Environmental release or escape of a GMV provides the opportunity for recombination with 
poxviruses present in target and non-target animals, including humans. In most parts of the 
world the occurrence and distribution of naturally occurring poxviruses are virtually 
unknown. But, in central-Africa it has been proposed that the vaccinia- rinderpest vaccine 
(RVFH) might recombine with a pox-relative, namely monkeypoxvirus. Since smallpox has 
been eradicated, the monkey pox is at present the most feared poxvirus (Reed, 2004), and 
has for instance caused virulent outbreaks in Zaire (Kaaden et al., 2002).  
Under natural circumstances the probability of recombination may be low, but predictions 
and forecasts are made impossible by the fact that we lack knowledge about the natural 
occurrence and prevalence of poxviruses in all parts of the world. Furthermore, even when 
recombination events are rare, the consequences may be serious since one viral progeny 
particle may multiply into millions of identical particles in a matter of hours. In this context, 
it is disturbing that the present regulatory frameworks are based on a one time risk 
assessment of any given GMV, and does not take into account the putative consequences 
that may arise from successive releases of the same, or related, GMVs. 
During the global smallpox eradication program (in the 1970s) transmission from vaccinated 
to unvaccinated persons was estimated to occur at a rate of 27 infected per million total 
vaccinated (Centre for Disease Control, 1991). It has been possible to isolate the vaccinia 
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virus from domesticated animals that have been in contact with recently vaccinated 
humans. The potential host spectrum of vaccinia virus is very broad and includes laboratory 
animals, pigs, cattle, camel, and monkey species (Fenner, 1996). In the past, vaccinia virus 
has for instance spread from vaccinated humans to domestic animals such as cattle (through 
milkers) and buffaloes, before spreading within the herd. Furthermore, it has been reported 
that during outbreaks of buffalopox, the buffalopox virus infected unvaccinated humans 
(Dumbell & Richardson, 1993). In Brazil, an emerging virus with similar characteristics as a 
smallpox vaccine virus caused disease both in cattle and their human caretakers (Damaso et 
al., 2000).  
GMVs made for wildlife vaccination must be thermostable and have long environmental 
persistence, and VACs satisfy these criteria. The vaccinia-rabies vaccine (VRG), for instance, 
has been reported to persist 4 months under natural conditions without a significant loss of 
viral infectivity (Brochier et al., 1990). Environmental stability is a prerequisite for herd 
immunity in target animals, but by the same token it increases the risk of non-target effects, 
and for spread to non-target species and other ecosystems.  
VACV has been shown, in cell cultures, to easily engage in genetic recombination with other 
orthopoxvirus species (Ball, 1987). A high number of closely related viral species are known, 
and high degrees of sequence homology across species borders have been demonstrated. It 
may, however, be safely assumed that a high number of unknown orthopoxviruses are 
circulating in many different types of ecosystems and biotopes all over the world. Biological 
(i.e. insects, migratory birds and animals, domestic and pet animal trade, infected individuals 
in an incubation period etc), as well as mechanical, (i.e. automobiles, airplanes) vectors may 
enable further dissemination and transmission of a virus to other ecosystems. Changed 
tropism for particular cells or tissues may result in divergent virulence in the target, or other 
known, host species for the GMV or its recombinant progenies compared to the parental, 
unmodified poxvirus (Traavik, 1999). In addition, the GMV or its recombinant progenies 
may have had their host restriction programs changed, so that the viruses can transfer to 
and infect formerly resistant host species. Other phenotypic changes may also happen. For 
instance, it has been reported that GE of a poxvirus created a GMV that was more virulent 
than the non-modified virus. As part of a strategy to develop pest animal contraceptive 
vaccines, the gene encoding human interleukin-4 (IL-4) was inserted into the Ectromelia virus 
(mousepox) genome (Jackson et al., 2001). Expression of IL-4 was intended to curb unwanted 
anti-viral effects. Unexpectedly, genetically mouse pox-resistant mice infected with the IL-4 
expressing virus developed symptoms of acute mouse pox accompanied by high mortality. 
7.3 Non-target effects and transboundary spread  
GMV administration may have non-target effects. Baits containing GMVs may be eaten both 
by target and non-target animals. In the second instance, viral spread may also take place by 
direct/indirect human/animal contact, or by installation of the GMV into a food web. A 
non-target GMV transfer was illustrated by the account of a woman, with a predisposing 
skin disease, who, having removed a VRG bait from the mouth of her dog, became infected 
and developed pox lesions (Rupprecht et al., 2001).  
The eradication of rabies by vaccination may have indirect consequences for the ecological 
balance; lack of disease favours an increase in the host animal population, in this case the 
European red fox. Therefore, it is crucial that monitoring of GMVs in the environment is  
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initiated with the purpose to follow-up the performed risk assessment, to map the actual 
environmental effects and to identify unforeseen adverse ecological effects. 
GMVs or their progenies resulting from mutations and/or recombination events may 
achieve new phenotypic traits of importance for their ecology, spread and host preferences. 
The opportunities for long distance spread and cross-species transfer of mammalian viruses 
have increased in recent years due to enhanced contact between humans and animal 
reservoirs. It is, however, difficult to predict when such events will take place since the viral 
adaptations that are needed are multifactorial and stochastic. Recent examples of viruses 
that have crossed species barriers are HIV, hantaviruses, haemorrhagic fever viruses, 
various arboviruses (e.g. West Nile Virus), avian and porcine influenza viruses, SARS-
associated coronavirus, Nipah and Hendra viruses, and monkeypox virus. 
The emergence of new viral infections often follows environmental, ecological and 
technological changes caused by human activities (Louz et al., 2005). Such activities may 
lead to an increased contact between humans and livestock on one hand, and animal hosts 
acting as reservoirs of zoonotic viruses on the other hand. Agricultural development, an 
increased exploitation of environmental resources, growth and increase in the mobility of 
the human population and trade and transportation of food and livestock, have been 
identified as important factors contributing to the introduction and spread of a number of 
new viruses in the human population. 
Against this background the intensified use of viruses and their genetically modified 
variants as viral gene transfer vectors for biomedical research, experimental gene therapy 
and as live-vector vaccines is a cause for concern (reviewed by Louz et al., 2005). 
7.4 Future safety prospects 
There are now a number of examples that unwanted characteristics of poxvirus vectors can 
be modified or excluded by targeted mutagenesis, homologous recombination and reverse 
genetics (Najera et al., 2006; Chakroudi et al., 2005). But the safety benefits of these 
approaches can only be taken out when we have clarified putative GMV characteristics and 
adverse effect issues within the categories “known unknowns” as well as “unknown 
unknowns”.  
8. The normative challenge by the concepts of harm and unwanted ecological 
consequences 
In previous sections we have described several potential harms to the environment and 
discussed the relevance for ERA and risk management strategies. We will here discuss 
concepts and definitions related to harms and hazards in the context of legislative 
frameworks, and we will argue that for descriptive as well as for normative purposes, 
biological, ecological and ethical terms are needed for identification of unwanted harm and 
unwanted ecological consequences..  
Endpoints of any risk assessment and risk management are always connected to the 
regulative framework. Article 1 of the Cartagena Protocol specifies that the entire objective 
of the document is to protect and conserve biodiversity according to a precautionary 
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approach. In the EU directive 2001/18/EC, it is stated that the applicant must submit a 
notification including an environmental risk assessment that considers direct and indirect 
effects, immediate and delayed effects, as well as potential cumulative and long term effects 
due to interaction with other GMOs and the environment. Harms to human and animal 
health are aspects that need to be characterised broadly. These include consideration of 
direct effects, e.g. development of disease, and indirect effects that may have a more 
complex nature; i.e. altered susceptibility to disease, welfare aspects and harm in social and 
ethical terms. With regard to harm to the environment, potential effects include the 
influence on and interactions with all organisms in the environment, and may be direct or 
indirect. Direct effects concern biological impacts on organisms, while indirect effects 
concern effects on animal health, contamination of wild gene pools or alterations in 
ecological relationships.  
The legislative framework leaves many questions about what is to be treated as harm, which 
is a concept that both is descriptive and normative. For example, Raybould points to a 
central normative problem in the relationship between risk research and risk assessment of 
GM crops, and argues that the problem formulation (step 1) strongly depends on the 
respective stakeholder interests with regard to the environment and the goods and 
processes that need to be protected (Raybould, 2006). Moreover it is not only step 1 in 
environmental risk assessment but also step 5 that is a normative issue (Hill, 2005), hence 
risk assessments include value judgements both with regard to consequences that should be 
avoided and the process of risk characterisation. These choices are most often made before 
the risk assessment has been initiated. Accordingly, the question of harm is correlated to 
conception of human welfare and how to maintain and preserve nature and biodiversity. 
What is to count as serious harm to nature is based on contestable value judgments. There 
are for example distinct philosophical differences between giving priority to protection of 
human interests, i.e. anthropocentrism, versus preservation of ecosystems, i.e. biocentrism 
and ecocentrism (Dobson, 1998; Westra, 1998). In an anthropocentric context, the 
environment is protected to promote human well-being, as recreation purposes, or seen as a 
source for gaining new knowledge, assuming ecosystems to contain unknown information. 
Moreover, biodiversity centres represent valuable genetic pools for future agricultural and 
medicinal development. Hence, human interests provide a powerful set of motives for 
protecting the environment against activities that may have severe consequences (i.e. 
reduced biodiversity) for present and future generations.  
Biocentrics and eccocentrics emphasize the need for a change from the anthropocentric 
exploitation of the environment towards a greater respect for the integrity of the animals 
and the environment. Biocentrics argue that as humans, we must provide rights to species 
and habitats and hence it is our duty to respect their integrity (Regan, 1980). An ecocentric 
approach involves more than consideration of impacts on human welfare and 
sustainability, and focuses on changes in both the biotic and the abiotic environment, as 
for instance effects on soil, water and air. Ecocentric approaches are not only aware of 
integrity of the animals and the environment, but do also acknowledge ecosystem 
integrity. In this context, preservation and protection of biological, ecological and genetic 
processes are necessary, irrespective of the instrumental value to humans. Application 
and release of GMVs can then be justified if it promotes the welfare of the ecosystem, or 
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when it protects or adds to the diversity of the species in the community. This ideology 
differs with regard to value commitments and factual beliefs from anthropocentric GMV 
governance. Hence, how we approach the environment and the values we put on the 
environment may also affect the frames and approaches chosen in environmental risk 
assessment and management. 
8.1 Problem formulation processes for involvement of normative issues 
To take into account the normative issues Nelson and Banker (2007) have suggested that 
step 1 in the environmental risk assessment need to be developed into a “Problem 
Formulation”. Scientists in support of the ecological approach to risk assessment of GM 
crops (see section 5.1) have been involved in developing the problem formulation and 
option assessment (PFOA) tool, that is based on stocktaking exercises, stakeholder 
consultation and broader public participation procedures. The PFOA has been used in 
developing countries with the intention to improve the ERA and as a technology assessment 
tool and entails involvement of not only scientists but also the public in identification of the 
problem to be analysed. Various types of knowledge held by the public in general (local 
knowledge) as well as knowledge held by different interest groups and affected parties are 
here seen as valuable insights that may help to critically broaden the scope of the risk 
assessment and are also considered important in identification of protection goals. 
Moreover, local knowledge is also highly relevant with regard to development of risk 
management strategies and can give valuable insight with regard to local conditions 
relevant for risk associated research and in monitoring activities.   
By transforming ERA into a problem formulation process we would like to add that besides 
including local knowledge there is also a need for broader scientific expertise to ensure a 
thorough assessment of the GMV in question. By extending the scientific experts involved 
from molecular biologists and virologists, to include ecologists, biologists as well as ethicists 
and sociologists, more diverse approaches to problem formulation processes can be ensured. 
Involvement of different scientific disciplines will also be crucial in elaboration of normative 
issues, in identification of protection goals and in development of management strategies. 
The scientists involved should share their opinions with the public as well as relevant 
political authorities.  
9. Precautionary principle and precautionary approaches 
We have discussed how risk assessment and management strategies are developed within 
particular frameworks, including normative standards and preferences regarding our 
relation to the natural environment and the preservation/promotion of the environment 
(see section 5 and 8). In such cases, decision-makers have to make decisions that will include 
the challenging issue of how to handle uncertainties. We consider that the uncertainties 
involved with GMVs entail that the precautionary principle needs to be employed (Myhr & 
Traavik, 2007).  
The precautionary principle is a normative principle for making practical decisions under 
conditions of scientific uncertainty, and provides a general approach to environmental and 
health protection (EC, 2000). The actual content of the precautionary principle and the 
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practical implications of its implementation in policy issues are however controversial 
(Foster et al., 2000). Several versions of the principle, ranging from ecocentric to 
anthropocentric, and from risk-adverse to risk-taking positions have been put forward 
(Raffensperger & Tickner, 1999). Here we would like to acknowledge the version of the 
principle that can be found in the 1990 Bergen Declaration on Sustainable Development:  
“In order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on the precautionary 
principle. Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack causes of 
environmental degradation. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack 
of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.”  
What we appreciate with this version is the commitment to anticipate, prevent and attack 
causes of environmental degradation. We also acknowledge the passive voice in the 
following part of this version of the principle; “lack of full scientific certainty should not be 
used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation”, and see 
that this entails lack of requirement of action. However, this version of the principle 
connects the importance of taking caution in innovation with the achievement of sustainable 
development, and is active in nature by stating that in practice its application demands 
anticipation and prevention of harms. For GMVs the present lack of knowledge and the 
uncertainties with regard to environmental effects as for example with regard to potential 
recombinational events, non-target effects and transboundary spread entails the necessity to 
initiate targeted research, in line with a precautionary approach to decision-making. In this 
sense, it can be argued that this version of the principle extends from being a formulaic 
decision-making rule to also include an approach to include scientific activity in decision-
making  
The important elements of what represents a precautionary approach to decision-making 
are (Wickson et al., 2011): 
1. The use of scientific research that is broadly framed, interdisciplinary, able to consider 
indirect causal mechanisms, and contributory to a lifecycle approach to analysis. 
2. A recognition of the limitations of this scientific knowledge and a willingness to expose 
the knowledge to critical reflection and ‘extended peer review’, particularly so as to 
create transparency about embedded choices and assumptions. 
3. A commitment to reducing uncertainties and minimising surprises generated by 
ignorance through vigilance and ongoing research and monitoring. 
4. A transparent handling of ambiguity and indeterminacy through interdisciplinary 
approaches and broadly based public participation. This handling includes the 
consideration and implementation of a range of socio-technical alternatives and policy 
options.  
10. Conclusion 
So far no GMVs have been thoroughly risk assessed from an environmental point of view. 
Risk assessments have focused on unintended effects of the vaccine arising in the vaccinated 
individuals, or in individuals of the same species that are infected by virus shed from 
vaccinated individuals. Here we have elaborated that risk assessment and management 
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strategies need to be connected, and that a precautionary approach needs to be employed to 
GMVs.  
A precautionary approach to GMVs includes initiation of risk-associated research with the 
intention to advance specific hypotheses about GMV specific harm and hazard assessment 
and management endpoints. Investigation of potential adverse effects and preventive 
measures needs to be initiated according to research and policy agendas encouraging broad 
and long-term thinking that supports precautionary actions. We consider that problem 
formulation processes represent a good approach for how to broaden the involvement of 
expertise and knowledge, and for identification of normative issues. As illustrated in section 
8, risk management endpoints are dependent on both scientific and normative aspects, 
hence how nature, how harm and environmental damage are identified can influence the 
objectives of environmental risk management and thereby be used to identify specific 
targets for protection. These endpoints are also dependent on the objectives of 
environmental risk assessment research. After identification of endpoints, specific 
hypotheses for characterization of risk can be developed which enables targeted research to 
be carried out, where models are used and data are collected with the purpose of testing the 
risk hypotheses. We have in 4.5 briefly described some of the research that has been carried 
out in our own institution. We would like to stress that such approaches represent a good 
platform for research initiatives in other countries. Such risk-associated research can include 
questions presented in section 6.1. Accordingly, the assessment and management of 
potential adverse effects must include conception of the ecological background as well as 
normative discussions with regard to endpoints. Approaches that take this into account may 
secure that the final stages have a broad basis for decision-making: both with regard to 
representation and involvement of ecological aspects and ethical values. 
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